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Résumé / Abstract
Au cours de la dernière décennie, le Chapitre 11 du U.S. Bankruptcy
Code a été lobjet de critiques importantes de la part de juristes et déconomistes
américains. Récemment, un certain nombre de ces juristes ont soulevé la possibilité
de réformer le Chapitre 11 sur la base du système canadien en matière de
réorganisation commerciale. Le but du présent article est de démontrer que
lexpérience canadienne en matière de réorganisation commerciale est révélatrice
sur les réformes potentielles à apporter au Chapitre 11. Les données canadiennes
montrent clairement que les taux dacceptation, de confirmation et de succès des
propositions commerciales sont très élevés. De plus, la probabilité de survie des
firmes canadiennes est de dix fois supérieure à celle des firmes américaines. Les
données canadiennes permettent également de rejeter laffirmation selon laquelle
léchec de la procédure de réorganisation origine de son utilisation par les petites
entreprises. Qui plus est, la procédure canadienne offre une solution rapide aux
entreprises en difficultés financières et un rendement espéré aux créanciers supérieur
par rapport à la procédure de liquidation. Sur la base de notre évaluation
comparative des deux systèmes dinsolvabilité, nous suggérons la révision plutôt
que labolition du Chapitre 11.
Over the last decade, Chapter 11 has been the brunt of serious
criticism. Some American jurists arguing in favor of revising Chapter 11 have
raised the possibility that the Canadian reorganization system might be a good
alternative to the existing U.S. system. This article argues that there are friutful
lessons to be learned from the Canadian experience with court-supervised
reorganization. Canadian experience shows that acceptance, confirmation, and
consummation rates of proposals are very high. Moreover, firms reorganizing
in Canada are almost ten times more likely to survive reorganization than their
American counterparts. Furthermore, Canadian data yield no support for the
claim that problems with bankruptcy law result from an over-abundance of small
firms in reorganization. The analysis also shows that the Canaidan
reorganization procedure offers a very rapid solution to financial distress and
that creditors gain, in expected value terms, from reorganization over
liquidation. Based on our evaluation of the relative performance of both systems,
we argue that Chapter 11 be revised rather than repealed.
Mots Clés : Faillite, Réorganisation, Chapitre 11, Loi sur la faillite
Keywords : Bankruptcy, Reorganization, Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Act
JEL : G33
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, bankruptcy laws in many industrial countries have
been the object of erce attacks by jurists and economists. At the same
time, many countries have revised their bankruptcy laws. France and the
United Kingdom adopted new insolvency/bankruptcy laws in 1985 and 1986,
respectively, while in Canada, a series of amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
came into eect in December 1992.
1
In the U.S., the very existence of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is
being seriously challenged. A number of authors have suggested replacing
Chapter 11 with a market-oriented valuation mechanism.
2
It is argued that a
market-oriented scheme is the best method for dividing the reorganization pie
while ensuring that rms come out of reorganization with the appropriate
capital structure. The main drawback with this type of scheme is that it
involves substantial revisions to existing bankruptcy and corporate laws as
well as a fundamental change in the design of bankruptcy laws. In addition,
it involves the creation of new nancial markets for rights in reorganized rms
and all the information and coordination problems that go along with it.
3
Others have proposed substantial revisions to the way Chapter 11 deals with
insolvency.
4
Without suggesting the abolition of Chapter 11, they propose
1
J. Beardsley, The New French Bankruptcy Statute, 19 International Lawyer (1985); D.
Webb, An Economic Evaluation of Insolvency Procedures in the United Kingdom: Does
the 1986 Insolvency Act Satisfy the Creditors' Bargain, 43 Oxford Economic Papers (1991);
T. Fisher & J. Martel, Will the Bankruptcy Reforms Work? An Empirical Analysis of
Financial Reorganization in Canada, XX Canadian Public Policy (1994); J. Martel, More
on the Impact of Bankruptcy Reform in Canada. Working Paper 94s-17, CIRANO (1994).
2
P. Aghion, O. Hart and J. Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J. of
Law, Economics and Organization (1992); L. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 Harvard Law Review (1988); M. Bradley and M. Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale Law Journal (1992); R. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Texas Law Review (1992); M.
Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Columbia
Law Review (1983).
3
D. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 Journal of Law & Economics (1993).
4
D. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. of Legal Studies
(1986); D. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 Law and Contemporary Problems
(1987); T. Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11, 43 U. of Toronto Law
Journal (1993); L. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, Wisconsin Law Review (1993);
T. Eisenberg and S. Tagashira, Should we Abolish Chapter 11? Evidence from Japan, 23
J. of Legal Studies (1994); T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy: Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986.
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that bankruptcy laws should respect existing rights and honor negotiated
agreements since not doing so invites inecient strategic behavior.
Attacks on Chapter 11 are based on a number of stylized facts that high-
light the negative aspects of a court-supervised reorganization procedure.
The literature contains six fundamental criticisms of Chapter 11.
1. The probability of conrmation in Chapter 11 is very low. Two re-
cent studies show that the conrmation rate in Chapter 11 is less than
20 percent, suggesting that Chapter 11 is better at promoting failure
rather than rescuing rms in nancial diculty.
5
2. Small businesses ling for Chapter 11 typically end up in liquidation.
In a sense, this is related to the rst point since Flynn (1989) estimates
that the probability of conrmation is about ve times higher for cases
with more than $1 million in assets compared to cases with less than
$1 million in assets. Since roughly 80 percent of Chapter 11 cases led
since 1979 involve assets under $1 million, some authors suggest that
Chapter 11 should be oriented towards the rescue of large rms and
that small and medium size rms should be routed to Chapter 7.
6
3. The probability of emerging from a Chapter 11 reorganization as an
ongoing business is very low.
7
Recent data show that rms have a less
than 10 percent chance of surviving Chapter 11 proceedings.
4. Unsecured creditors usually have a weak bargaining position relative
to the debtor. Chapter 11 gives the debtor an exclusivity period to
propose a reorganization plan of 120 days after ling for bankruptcy
plus a 60-day period for its approval by creditors. This exclusivity
period is often extended by the court, which makes it very dicult
5
E. Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Division of the Administra-
tive Oce of the U.S. Court (1989); S. Jensen-Conklin, Do Conrmed Chapter 11 Plans
Consummate? The Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 Commercial Law Jour-
nal (1992); L. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal (1983).
6
G. Bermant, A. Lombard and E. Wiggin, A Day in the Life: The Federal Judicial
Center's 1988-1989 Bankruptcy Court Time Study, 65 American Bankruptcy Law Journal
(1991); T. Eisenberg and S. Tagashira, supra note 4; T. Eisenberg, supra note 4.
7
S. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 5; D. Baird, supra note 3.
3
for creditors to propose their own plans or amendments to the original
plan.
8
5. The absolute priority rule is systematically violated in Chapter 11.
9
This is also related to the last point since creditors may be willing to
forego part of their claims to speed-up the procedures.
6. Chapter 11 is time-consuming, litigious, and costly.
10
Rather than ask whether a market-oriented system is more appropriate
than a legally-oriented system, we examine the more modest question of
whether the existing U.S. Bankruptcy Code can be improved, and if so, how.
Some American jurists have raised the possibility that the Canadian system
may well be a good alternative to the existing U.S. system.
11
The empirical
work of Martel and Fisher & Martel clearly shows that the Canadian reor-
ganization process does not suer many of the same pitfalls as Chapter 11.
12
Moreover, comparing the U.S. and Canadian reorganization procedures, LoP-
ucki & Triantis conclude:
8
L. LoPucki and W. Withford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. of Pennsylvania Law Review
(1990); L. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims,
27 Journal of Financial Economics (1990).
9
K. Daigle and M. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Expla-
nation, 37 Journal of Law and Economics (1994); A. Eberhart, W. Moore and R. Roenfeldt,
Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings, 45 Journal of Finance (1990); J. Franks and W. Torous, An Empirical Investigation
of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 Journal of Finance (1989); and L. Weiss, supra note
8.
10
E. Flynn, supra note 5; S. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 5; M. White, Bankruptcy
Liquidation and Reorganization, in Handbook of Modern Finance, ed. D. Logue, Boston,
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Chapter 35 (1984).
11
G. Triantis, The Interplay of Liquidation and Reorganization in the Bankruptcy Sys-
tems of Canada and the U.S.: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers and Guillotines, 16
International Review of Law & Economics (1996).
12
T. Fisher & J. Martel, supra note 1; T. Fisher & J. Martel, Financial Reorganization
in Canada, 2 Canadian Business Economics (1994); T. Fisher & J. Martel, The Cred-
itors' Financial Reorganization Decision: New Evidence from Canadian Data, 11 J. of
Law, Economics and Organization (1995); J. Martel, supra note 1; J. Martel, Commer-
cial Bankruptcy and Financial Reorganization in Canada, Working Paper 94c-2, CIRANO
(1994).
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\ : : : it should be possible to determine the relative merits of the two
approaches through an empirical comparison of the outcomes of reor-
ganization in the two countries."
This quote precisely captures the aim of the present paper. In particular,
we use data on the reorganization process in Canada and compare it to data
from U.S. studies to see what lessons for Chapter 11 can be learned from the
Canadian experience with nancial reorganization.
A comparative study of this type raises two issues: rst, whether the
process of reorganization in Canada is suciently similar to Chapter 11 to
justify the exercise, and second, whether rms reorganizing in Canada are
comparable to rms using Chapter 11 in the U.S. Other comparative studies,
like Eisenberg and Tagashira (1994), which use Japanese rms undergoing
reorganization as a yardstick for the Chapter 11 procedure, are, of course,
subject to the same concerns.
On the rst count, obviously there are dierences between Chapter 11
and the Canadian reorganization procedure.
13
However, as pointed out by
LoPucki & Triantis (1994), although both systems dier in their doctrine,
there are important similarities in their functioning.
14
Both require a plan
to be led by debtors, approved by creditors, and conrmed by the court.
Key aspects of any reorganization plan under either system are the proposed
payment to creditors and the structure of the payments. Lastly, rms emerge
as ongoing entities from Chapter 11 or the Canadian reorganization proce-
dure only if they meet all the provisions of their reorganization plans. Given
these similarities, it is natural to consider the implications of the Canadian
experience for potential reform to Chapter 11. In addition, we will argue
below that the dierences that do exist between the two systems highlight
precisely the reforms needed for Chapter 11. It should be noted that the
data used in this study are from the period prior to the 1992 amendments
to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act. The revisions, which came into eect in
December 1992, made the Canadian bankruptcy system more similar to the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
15
Thus, future comparative studies of the U.S. and
13
L. Lopucki & G. Triantis, supra note 14; G. Triantis, supra note 11.
14
L. Lopucki & G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian
Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, Harvard International Law Journal,
35 (1994). According to the authors, \Although the lawmakers in the two countries set
out to create very dierent systems, the systems were bound to converge over time toward
a steady state in which the parts would form a functional whole."
15
The idea of having a \Canadian" Chapter 11 is not new. In 1984, the newly appointed
5
Canada will be based on even more similar reorganization procedures.
Whether the Canadian rms examined in this paper are similar to rms
passing through Chapter 11 in the U.S. is dicult to say, primarily because
there is no data set on U.S. rms that is comparable to the data we exam-
ine here. Excepting Flynn (1989), U.S. empirical studies typically have two
features in common: a small number of observations and nonrandom sam-
ples.
16
In contrast, the data that we examine here comprise a relatively large
number of observations that are randomly chosen from the population of all
reorganizing rms under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act. Thus, while we are
condent the Canadian data present an accurate portrait of reorganization,
the same cannot be said for the U.S. data used for comparison.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the Cana-
dian reorganization procedure. Section 3 briey describes how the data were
collected and section 4 discusses the main characteristics of the rms present
in the data. Section 5 contains our analysis of the relative performance of the
court-supervised reorganization procedure in Canada and the U.S. Section 6
uses the analysis of the previous section to make some tentative recommenda-
tions for reforming Chapter 11. Section 7 contains a few concluding remarks.
2 Canadian Reorganization Procedure
In Canada, insolvency comes under federal jurisdiction and statute. In ad-
dition, there exist two distinct court-supervised reorganization procedures:
Minister of the Department of Consumer and Corporate Aairs, which was responsible for
the administration of the Bankruptcy Act in Canada, stated that the government should
consider introducing a new bankruptcy law similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See
Mayrand. M, The Background of Canadian Bankruptcy Law, Policy Forum on Reform of
the Bankruptcy Act, ed., Frank Lewis, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic
Policy, Queen's University, 1985.
16
Casey, C.; McGee, V.; and Stickney, C. \Discriminating Between Reorganized and
Liquidated Firms in Bankruptcy." 61 The Accounting Review (1986) and Franks and
Torous, supra note 9, examine only successful Chapter 11 cases, which are clearly not
representative of all rms attempting reorganization. The White 1984), supra note 10 and
the LoPucki (1983), supra note 5, studies are conned to specic geographical areas and,
as such, their data may not be representative of all U.S. rms going through Chapter 11.
The same conclusion applies to White, M. \Economics of Bankruptcy: Liquidation and
Reorganization." Working Paper No. 239. New York: Solomon Brother Center for the
Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York
University (1981).
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(i) a proposal pursuant to Part III of the Bankruptcy Act
17
and (ii) a proposal
under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (hereafter CCAA).
18
The Insolvency Act, which applied only to businesses, was introduced
in 1869 and repealed in 1880. Thus, Canada was without any insolvency
legislation until 1919 when the Bankruptcy Act (hereafter BA), which was
largely borrowed from the British Bankruptcy Act of 1904, was enacted. The
BA was revised in 1949, oering recourse to insolvent individuals as well as
to insolvent businesses.
19
As mentioned above, the BA was again revised in
December 1992.
20
The CCAA was enacted in 1933 to facilitate the reorganization of insol-
vent companies, a procedure not provided by the BA of 1919. It originally
applied to all insolvent companies but an amendment in 1953 restricted its
use to debtors having outstanding secured or unsecured bonds issued under
a trust deed.
21
Given that there exists very little to no information on rms
using the CCAA, we concentrate our analysis on reorganization under the
BA prior to the December 1992 amendments.
22
A proposal under the BA can only be led by an insolvent or a bankrupt
debtor.
23
The reorganization process is triggered upon the ling of a proposal
17
Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
18
An Act to Facilitate Compromises and Arrangements Between Companies and Their
Creditors, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
19
For some historical background and a detailed discussion of bankruptcy and insolvency
in Canada, see A. Bohemier, Faillite et Insolvabilite, Tome 1, Montreal, ed. Themis, 1992,
L. Duncan & J. Honsberger, Bankruptcy in Canada, 3d, Ed. Toronto, Canada Law
Book Company Ltd (1961) and B. Leonard, Guide to Commercial Insolvency in Canada,
Butterworths, Toronto, 1988.
20
An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act and to Amend the Income Tax in consequence
thereof (Bill C-22), S.C. 1992, c. 27. Correspondence between sections of the \old" and
the \new" acts are given in brackets in footnotes.
21
C.C.A.A. x3.
22
Although there are yet no formal records on the use of the CCAA, the authors are
presently setting up an original data set on rms reorganizing under this procedure. Con-
trary to perception, the CCAA is used much less often than the reorganization procedure
under the BA.
23
BA. x50. An insolvent person is dened as \a person who is not bankrupt and who
resides or carries on business in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims
under the BA amount to $1000, and (a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations
as they generally become due, (b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the
ordinary course of business as they generally become due, and (c) the aggregate of whose
property is not, at a fair valuation, sucient, or, if disposed at a fairly conducted sale
under legal process, would not be sucient to enable payments of all obligations, due and
7
with a licensed trustee. The trustee is then responsible for supervising the
proceedings, informing creditors about the nancial situation of the debtor,
conducting investigations into the aairs and the property of the debtor, and
calling the meetings of creditors.
24
Creditors of an insolvent debtor are not
entitled to le a proposal but they may propose amendments to the original
proposal before the proposal is nally approved. However, a proposal can be
modied only with the debtor's consent.
The BA identies two broad classes of creditors. First, there are secured
creditors, which are dened as persons holding a mortgage, charge, lien or
security interest against the property of the debtor. Second, there are unse-
cured creditors, who are persons not falling into the above category. There
are two classes of unsecured creditors: (i) preferred creditors, who receive
priority in the distribution of the debtor's assets, and (ii) ordinary creditors.
The ling of a proposal triggers an automatic stay of proceedings, which
freezes all unsecured creditors' rights against the rm's assets.
25
Secured
creditors are not bound by the stay of proceedings and they may realize or
deal with their security in the event of default by the debtor.
26
However,
their rights may be stayed by the Court, for a period of up to six months
from the date of approval of the proposal, in order to give the debtor some
breathing room.
27
The stay of proceedings enables the debtor to continue
operating under the protection of the bankruptcy court while negotiating a
new arrangement with its creditors. Typically, this arrangement takes the
form of repaying creditors gradually over time. The repayments may be made
in cash or installments or in equity in the reorganized rm, or some combi-
nation thereof. In practice, a plan ensures the payment of secured claims in
accordance with existing arrangements between the debtor and the secured
creditors. Similarly, preferred claims are paid in full before anything is paid
to ordinary creditors. Ordinary creditors are oered partial or sometimes full
payment of their original claims. During reorganization, the original manage-
ment usually remains in control of the rm. However, creditors may appoint
accruing due." A bankrupt person refers to \a person who has made an assignment or
against whom a receiving order has been made or the legal status of that person." BA.
x2.
24
BA. xx50(5), 51(1) [BIA. xx50(5), 51(1)].
25
BA. x69(1) [BIA. x69(1)].
26
Since 1992, the rights of secured creditors are stayed for a 30-days period following
the ling of a notice of intention to le a proposal by a debtor. BIA. xx69(1), 69(2).
27
BA. x69(2).
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a committee of inspectors, which stays in place for the period covered by the
proposal, to supervise the activities of the debtor.
28
To be accepted, a proposal requires the armative vote of a majority
in number of unsecured creditors representing at least 75 percent in value
of the proven claims of unsecured creditors voting, personally or by proxy,
at the meeting.
29
Secured creditors are not entitled to vote on a proposal
unless their security is partially covered, in which case they may vote for the
unsecured portion of their claims.
30
If the proposal is rejected, the debtor
is deemed to have made a voluntary assignment on the day the proposal
was led.
31
If the proposal is accepted, the trustee applies to the court
for conrmation.
32
A proposal cannot be conrmed unless claims are paid
according to the absolute priority rule, meaning preferred creditors must be
paid in full before ordinary creditors receive any payment.
33
All monies are
payable to the trustee who is then responsible for distributing it to creditors.
34
In addition, the court may refuse to conrm a proposal under any of the
following circumstances: if it views that the proposal is unreasonable; if
it views the proposal not to be in the interest of creditors; if the debtor
has committed any oense mentioned in sections 198 to 200 of the BA;
35
if
any of the facts listed in sections 173 or 177 are proven against the debtor
and the proposal pays less than fty cents on the dollar on all unsecured
claims).
36
In the vast majority of cases, the court does not interfere with the
28
BA. xx55, 56 [BIA. xx55, 56].
29
BA. x2 (special resolution). The 1992 amendments lowered the claims criterion from
75 to 66
2
3
percent. BIA. x54(1).
30
Since 1992, a debtor may include secured creditors in a proposal. Secured creditors
covered by a proposal can either vote in favor of the proposal or opt out by rejecting
it. BIA. xx69.1(1), 69.1(6). However, secured creditors not covered by the proposal may
realize their security in the event of a default. BIA. x69.1(5).
31
BA. x57. Since 1992, the date of the assignment is the earliest of (i) the day on which
the proposal was led, (ii) the day on which the notice of intention, if any, was led, and
(iii) the day on which the rst petition, if any, for a receiving order in respect of that
insolvent person was led. BIA. x57.
32
BA. x58 [BIA. x58].
33
BA. x60(1) [BIA. x60(1)].
34
BA. x60(2) [BIA. x60(2)].
35
BA. x59(2) [BIA. x59(2)].
36
BA. x59(3) [BIA. x59(3)]. Since 1992, there are two necessary other conditions for
conrmation. First, the proposal must provide for the full repayment of claims for source
deductions within six months from conrmation. BIA. x60(1.1). Second, wage claims (for
a maximum of $2000 per worker) must be fully repaid upon conrmation. BIA. x60(1.3)
9
creditors' decision. A proposal accepted by the unsecured creditors and the
court is binding on all the unsecured creditors with provable claims.
37
If the
court refuses to conrm the proposal, the debtor is deemed to have made an
assignment on the day the proposal was led.
38
An accepted proposal is dened as successful when the debtor meets all
the terms of the proposal before the trustee is discharged.
39
The court may
annul the proposal if it feels that the proposal cannot continue without in-
justice or undue delay or upon an application by a creditor following default
on any of the provisions of the proposal.
40
Following an annulment by the
court, the debtor is deemed to have made an assignment on the day of the
annulment.
41
3 Data
Each reorganization plan made under the BA is led with one of the 15
regional bankruptcy oces of Industry Canada. The data in the present
study are collected directly from plans led by individual rms with the
Montreal and Toronto oces.
42
A random sample of 500 plans is taken from
the approximately 1,280 commercial reorganization plans led in the two
cities during the 1977{88 period.
43
Owing to insucient data and missing
or incomplete les, the nal sample has 393 les, of which 273 originated in
Montreal and 120 originated in Toronto.
44
37
BA. x62(2). Since 1992, a proposal is also binding on secured creditors who voted in
favor of a proposal. BIA. x62(2).
38
BA. x61(2). Since 1992, the date of assignment for a non conrmed proposal is de-
termined in the same fashion as the date of assignment for a rejected proposal. See supra
note 31.
39
The term `successful' is used by Fisher & Martel (1994a) and Martel (1994b), supra
note 12, though it is not dened in the BA and in the BIA.
40
BA. x63(1) [BIA. x63(1)].
41
BA. x63(4) [BIA. x63(4)].
42
For a detailed description of the data set, see Martel (1994a), supra note 12.
43
Random sampling is carried out using the Systematic Random Sampling Procedure.
The sample is chosen to be representative of the regional distribution of plans led each
year over the sample period.
44
Fisher and Martel (1994b), supra note 12, examine a similar data set of 338 reorganiz-
ing rms which led at the Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver bankruptcy
oces over the period 1978{87. The present data set has slightly more rms and includes
more variables.
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4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents nancial data on reorganizing rms. Firms attempting
reorganization under the BA are clearly quite small, with average assets of
$2.5 million and average debts of $3.0 million.
45
The vast majority of rms
in the sample are privately owned; there are only 10 with publicly traded
shares. As might be expected with nancial data, the variables are highly
skewed. For example, while the mean value of assets is $2.5 million, more
than 75 percent of the rms have assets of less than $1.2 million. A simple
regression of assets against a constant and year of ling indicates that there
is no statistically signicant trend in rm size over the sample period.
46
Obviously, rms ling for nancial reorganization face severe nancial
problems. The mean asset/debt ratio of 58 percent indicates just how bad
a position most of these rms are in.
47
The secured debt/asset ratio gives
an indication of the ability of reorganizing rms to attract new loans. Se-
cured debt represents around 55 percent of the assets of reorganizing rms,
indicating that there is some room for these rms to negotiate new secured
loans. Secured debt represents about one-third of total debt, which is to say
that rms rely heavily on secured debt. Moreover, on average, one-fth of
the total debt of reorganizing rms is owed to a single secured creditor. This
suggests that individual secured creditors may have a signicant amount of
bargaining power over rms when it comes to renegotiating loans. On av-
erage, government debt makes up less than 5 percent of total rm debt.
48
However, Fisher and Martel (1995) and Martel (1996a) nd that even this
small amount has a signicantly negative eect on the likelihood of successful
nancial reorganization.
49
There are around 110 creditors for each reorganizing rm, the vast major-
ity of which are ordinary creditors. Typically, the rms have only a handful
45
All dollar gures in the text are December 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the
gdp deator (Cansim Series Number D20556). To convert these gures to U.S. dollars,
the average noon spot exchange rate in December 1993 was US$1.00=C$1.33 (Cansim
Series Number B3400).
46
A similar regression with debts as the dependent variable yields an analogous result.
47
For comparison, the mean debt-asset ratio is 16.0 (excluding 14 rms with zero assets)
and the median ratio is 1.8.
48
The term `government debt' refers to money owed to federal and provincial govern-
ments and is sometimes referred to as `Crown debt'.
49
T. Fisher & J. Martel (1995), supra note 12; J. Martel, Signaling in Financial Reorga-
nization, Theory and Evidence from Canada, Unpublished Manuscript, CIRANO (1999).
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of secured creditors. Note also that wage earners, who, roughly speaking,
count as preferred creditors, are relatively rare. This is indicated by the
mean value for preferred creditors which is 7 times greater than the median
value.
Table 2 presents various descriptive statistics of the reorganization pro-
cess. The process moves along fairly quickly at the outset; at least half the
plans have been voted on by ordinary creditors within 25 days of ling. The
complete reorganization process (the time from ling to the discharge of the
debtor from bankruptcy by the court) takes quite a bit longer; the mean is
just over three years and the median is around two-and-a-half years.
The statistics on the creditors' meeting present a very interesting picture
of the process. Four plans in 10 are amended before creditors vote, so clearly
negotiation takes place between the debtor and its creditors. Around 30
creditors usually show up for the creditors meeting, but this represents only
about one-third of the creditors that are eligible to vote on the plan. Clearly,
the majority of ordinary creditors are either willing to forgo their rights to
participate in the reorganization decision of debtors that owe them money
or they rely on larger and better informed creditors to defend their interests
at the meeting.
The direct costs of reorganization are measured by the administration
costs, which have a mean value of $46,300 and a median of $20,000. The
largest component of administration costs are the fees paid to the bankruptcy
trustee, which typically account for around 70 percent of administration
costs. Using median values, it appears that administration costs are rela-
tively small compared to total debt or repayments to creditors. However,
recall that administration costs are given priority over all other claims and
that these reorganizing rms are severely nancially constrained. Therefore,
it is possible that the relatively small administration costs may have a signif-
icantly negative impact on the likelihood of successful reorganization, similar
to the eect of government claims.
5 Analysis
The primary aim of our work is to compare the ability of the U.S. and
Canadian reorganization procedures to screen viable from non-viable rms.
We use the following criteria to accomplish the task:
1. acceptance and conrmation of proposals
12
2. consummation of proposals
3. occurrence of ltering failure
4. expected payment and the best-interests test
5. administrative costs
6. length of the reorganization process
7. violation of absolute priority
Martel (1996a) models reorganization as a multi-stage game.
50
At the
rst stage of the game, the proposal is submitted to creditors for approval.
Following approval and conrmation by the court, the proposal is either
consummated or it is not, representing the second stage of the game.
51
Using
this framework, evaluating the U.S. and Canadian systems boils down to
looking at what happens at each stage of the game. This is the object of the
next three subsections.
5.1 Acceptance and Conrmation
One of the rst studies to report conrmation rates for rms in Chapter 11
is Lopucki (1983), which examines a sample of 41 rms ling for Chapter 11
in the Western District of Missouri during the period 1979{80.
52
According
to Lopucki, 27 percent of the reorganization proposals were conrmed by
the court. A more recent study by Flynn (1989) nds a signicantly lower
conrmation rate:
53
about 17 percent of the Chapter 11 cases led between
1979 and 1986 were conrmed by the bankruptcy court. Supporting Flynn,
Jensen-Conklin (1992) nds a conrmation rate of 17 percent in a sample of
260 Chapter 11 cases led in the Southern District of New York (Poughkeep-
sie) for the period 1980{89.
54
Given that eleven of these conrmed proposals
were liquidating proposals, the actual conrmation rate of reorganization
plans is around 13 percent.
50
J. Martel (1996a), supra note 49.
51
Martel does not consider conrmation by the court an independent stage of the game.
This is a weak assumption for Canada given the very high conrmation rate by the court.
52
L. LoPucki (1983), supra note 5.
53
E. Flynn, supra note 5.
54
S. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 5.
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According to one view, the conrmation rate is low because Chapter 11
attracts too many small businesses.
55
Eisenberg (1995) reports a Chapter 11
conrmation rate of 96 percent for rms with assets greater than $100 million,
a rate of 36 percent for rms with assets between $100 million and $1 million,
and a rate of 20 percent for rms with assets lower than $1 million.
56
Flynn
(1989) nds a conrmation rates of 7.4 percent for rms with assets less than
$100,000, 14 percent for rms with assets between $100,000 and $500,000,
22 percent for rms with assets between $500,000 and $1 million, and 36
percent for rms with assets over $1 million.
57
LoPucki & Withford (1991)
nd similar results: the 74 largest Chapter 11 cases led during the period
1979{88 had a conrmation rate of around 90 percent.
58
Weiss (1990) reports
a conrmation rate of 86 percent from a sample of 37 New York and American
Stock Exchange rms.
59
Thus, U.S. data suggest that conrmation rates
are signicantly higher for larger rms. However, as noted above, the real
conrmation rate is probably lower given the presence of a signicant number
of liquidating proposals.
Canadian data provide a very dierent picture. Martel (1994a) nds that
75 percent of the proposals are accepted by unsecured creditors.
60
Among
accepted proposals, 93 percent are conrmed by the bankruptcy court, im-
plying a conrmation rate for all proposals of 70 percent (75 percent times 93
percent). These gures support earlier ndings in Fisher & Martel (1994b)
who report an acceptance rate of 77 percent and that 96 percent of the
accepted proposals are conrmed by the court, resulting in a conrmation
rate of 74 percent.
61
Furthermore, as Table 3 shows, there seems to be no
correlation between either acceptance or conrmation rates and rm size,
contrary to U.S. evidence. Aggregating the data in Table 3 does not alter
this conclusion: the conrmation rate for cases with less than $1 million in
assets is 72 percent, compared with 65 percent for cases with more than $1
million in assets. The Canadian data also clearly show that the majority of
55
T. Eisenberg & S. Tagashira, supra note 4, D. Baird, supra note 3.
56
T. Eisenberg, Creating an Eective Swedish Reconstruction Law, Report prepared for
the Center for Business and Policy Studies, Stockholm, Sweden (1995).
57
E. Flynn, supra note 5. Flynn suggests that these statistics should be used with some
caution since the estimates of assets range are based on partial information.
58
L. Lopucki & W. Withford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly-Held Companies, 139 Wisconsin Law Review (1991).
59
L. Weiss, supra note 8
60
J. Martel (1994a), supra note 12.
61
T. Fisher & J. Martel, supra note 12.
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reorganizing rms are small. However, to the extent that there are problems
with the Canadian reorganization system, they clearly are not caused by the
presence of small rms with low acceptance and conrmation rates.
5.2 Consummation Rate
The second stage in reorganization comes down to whether a proposal is suc-
cessful or `consummated'. From a public policy perspective, it is important
to examine what happens after conrmation in order to shed some light on
the occurrence of ltering failure in reorganization. Until recently, few data
were available on this topic. To our knowledge, the only study which exam-
ined this question was conducted by Jensen-Conklin (1992) who nds that
47 percent of conrmed proposals are \denitely" consummated.
62
Using Canadian data, Fisher & Martel (1994b) and Martel (1994a) arrive
at a dierent conclusion.
63
Fisher & Martel nd that 81 percent of the
proposals accepted by unsecured creditors are consummated; Martel nds
that 72 percent of accepted proposals are consummated. In addition, Martel
shows that, as was the case for conrmation, there is no correlation between
the consummation rate and the size of the rm. This can be seen from
Table 3. Again, aggregating the data does not alter the main conclusion: the
consummation rate for rms with less than $1 million in assets is equal to
73 percent compared with 72 percent for rms with more than $1 million in
assets.
5.3 Filtering Failure
In recent years, the occurrence of ltering failure in bankruptcy has become
a concern for an increasing number of economists and legal experts. From
an eciency perspective, the bankruptcy system ideally promotes the reor-
ganization of viable rms and the elimination of non-viable rms. Filtering
failures occur when the elimination process fails. As pointed out by Tri-
antis (1996): \The merits of any bankruptcy system are determined by its
eectiveness in correcting the ineciencies that are signaled by the debtor's
62
S. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 5. A proposal is considered to be denitely consum-
mated if all payments promised to creditors in the plan are made. We also use this
denition here as it corresponds to the denition used by Fisher & Martel and Martel,
supra note 12 and Martel supra note 49.
63
T. Fisher & J. Martel and J. Martel, supra note 12.
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nancial distress." Triantis goes on to say: \: : : bankruptcy law is about
enhancing the value of the rm's assets rather than preserving them."
64
The results reported in sections 5.1 and 5.2 raise serious concerns about
the ability of Chapter 11 to lter rms in nancial distress. Jensen-Conklin
(1992) estimates that the probability of emerging from Chapter 11 as an
ongoing entity is equal to 8.0 percent.
65
Taking into account the presence of
liquidating proposals, Jensen-Conklin concludes that a Chapter 11 debtor has
a 6.5 percent chance of surviving as a going concern. Baird (1993) separates
Chapter 11 rms into three groups.
66
The rst group comprises small to
medium size businesses with assets under $500,000 and represents more than
two-thirds of the rms in Chapter 11. The second group comprises closely-
held rms of signicant size. The third group comprises rms with publicly
traded shares. Baird argues that the probability of surviving Chapter 11 is
strongly correlated to rm size. For instance, fewer than 10 percent of rms
in the small to medium size group emerge from Chapter 11 as going concerns.
Baird concludes: \Chapter 11 is simply a station to eventual liquidation."
The results in Fisher & Martel (1994b) and Martel (1994a) contrast sig-
nicantly with the ndings based on U.S. data.
67
According to their results,
the likelihood of Canadian rms surviving a reorganization under the BA
lies between 63 percent and 55 percent. This means that Canadian rms
are almost ten times more likely to survive reorganization than their U.S.
counterparts.
68
Fisher & Martel (1995) provide an alternative measure of ltering failure
by examining the possible incidence of Type I and Type II errors in the
outcome of the creditors' vote on proposals.
69
Following White (1994), a
Type I error occurs when a non-viable rm survives Chapter 11 and a Type II
error occurs when a viable rm is shut down in Chapter 7.
70
Using a sample
of 348 reorganizing rms, 264 proposals were accepted and 84 rejected.
71
Of
64
G. Triantis, supra note 11.
65
The probability of emerging from Chapter 11 as an ongoing entity is equal to the
conrmation rate times the consummation rate (17 percent times 47 percent). S. Jensen-
Conklin, supra note 5.
66
D. Baird, supra note 3.
67
T. Fisher & J. Martel and J. Martel, supra note 12.
68
The discussion on the reasons for such a dierence is postponed to the section on
\Implications for Chapter 11."
69
T. Fisher & J. Martel, supra note 12.
70
Fisher & Martel (1995) used the reverse the denitions for Type I and Type II errors.
71
These data are a subsample of those in Martel (1994a). Incomplete les and the les
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the 264 accepted proposals, 66 subsequently enter liquidation.
It is not possible to determine the number of cases where a Type II error
is committed, because it cannot be determined from the data which of the
rejected plans were made by viable rms. However, the possible incidence
of Type II errors can be determined given dierent levels of the incidence
of Type I errors together with the fact that 84 plans are rejected. Table 4
presents possible scenarios for the incidence of Type I and Type II errors.
72
The data show that the incidence of Type I errors is no less than 44 percent
while the incidence of Type II errors is no more than 30 percent. According
to White (1994) `ltering failure' occurs in the bankruptcy process when
Type I and II errors are committed by creditors. The overall incidence of
ltering failure in the data is between 19 percent (66/348) and 43 percent
(150/348).
White (1994) proposes a theoretical model which brings out what can go
wrong with Chapter 11.
73
White shows that, in the presence of asymmetric
information, it may be impossible to achieve full separation of viable and
non-viable rms. As a result, pooling equilibria arise in which both types
of rms oer the same reorganization contract. Martel (1996a) proposes
a game theoretic model in which viable rms can use the structure of the
reorganization contract in order to reduce the possibility of ltering failure.
74
According to Martel, rms can signal their viability by using cash payments
to creditors.
75
Empirically, Martel nds the probability of success in reorganization in-
creases with the proportion of short-term payments (within three to six
months) to creditors, which is consistent with the informational role played
for which the outcome is unknown are deleted from the Martel (1994a) sample.
72
Table 4 is determined as follows. If all 84 rejected plans are from non-viable rms, i.e.,
creditors always make the correct rejection decision, then the incidence of Type II errors
is zero and the incidence of Type I errors is 66=(66 + 84)  :440, giving the rst row. If
6 of the 84 rejected plans were from viable rms, then 78 rejected plans were made by
non-viable rms, the incidence of Type I errors is 66=(66 + 78)  :458 and the incidence
of Type II errors is 6=(6 + 198)  :029, giving the second row. The rest of the table is
determined the same way.
73
M. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations
and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J. of Law, Economics and Organization (1994)
74
J. Martel, supra note 49.
75
Martel also shows that, under certain conditions, pooling equilibria and ltering fail-
ures can also arise.
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by the structure of the reorganization contract. In addition, Martel nds
that the probability of acceptance of a proposal increases with the perceived
probability of success of the proposal by unsecured creditors. Using a dier-
ent approach, Fisher & Martel (1995) nd a similar result.
76
Based on their
econometric analysis of the creditors' vote in reorganization, they conclude
that the probability of acceptance of a proposal increases with the proportion
of cash payments oered in the contract. Again, this result is consistent with
the view that viable rms can use the structure of payments in reorganization
to separate themselves from non-viable rms, thereby reducing the incidence
of ltering failure.
5.4 Expected Payment and the Best-Interests Test
There are two additional key elements in evaluating the performance of the re-
organization process. First, the speed at which creditors are reimbursed, and
second, whether or not creditors expect a higher payment in reorganization
than in liquidation. Jurists refer to this second element as the best-interests
test while economists refer to it as the creditors' reorganization participation
constraint.
According to Jensen-Conklin (1992), the duration of payments specied
in U.S. plans ranges from immediately (i.e., upon conrmation) to approxi-
mately nine years after conrmation.
77
In addition, 54 percent of the plans
provide for complete repayment under the terms of the reorganization plan
within one year of conrmation.
In Canada, according to Martel (1994a), the duration of payments varies
from immediately to 10 years after conrmation. The average time for the
payment of the reorganization payo (i.e., the payment to creditors specied
in the plan) is 14 months.
78
The average grace period for the full sample is
3.7 months: 17 percent of the plans provide for no grace period, 30 percent
for a one-month grace period, 29 percent for a three-month grace period, 14
percent for a six-month grace period, and 11 percent for a grace period in ex-
cess of six months from conrmation. Martel also shows that out of the total
payment proposed to unsecured creditors, 9.7 percent is paid within strictly
less than one month, 32 percent is paid within one month, 50 percent is paid
within three months, 63 percent is paid within six months, and 78 percent
76
T. Fisher & J. Martel, supra note 12.
77
S. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 5.
78
J. Martel, supra note 12.
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is paid within 12 months of conrmation. Regression analysis also shows
that there exists a trade-o between quicker payments and a higher pro-
posed repayment. Similarly, a longer grace period is associated with a higher
proposed repayment.
79
These results clearly indicate that the Canadian reor-
ganization process oers a quicker reimbursement of creditors's claims than
Chapter 11.
Another important aspect in evaluating the performance of a reorganiza-
tion system is whether or not unsecured creditors gain relative to liquidation.
Theoretically, unsecured creditors will only approve a proposal if their par-
ticipation constraint is satised, that is if they gain more, in expected value
terms, in reorganization than in liquidation.
80
In judicial terms, the analog
to the participation constraint is the best-interests test. Compliance with
the best-interests test is a necessary condition for court approval under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
81
The Canadian BA makes no mention of compliance
with the best-interests test, but it does allow the court to reject proposals
that are not to the benet of the general body of creditors.
82
Surprisingly, there exists no evidence of compliance with the best-interests
test in the U.S. or Canada. The only available evidence is reported by the
Eisenberg & Tagashira (1994) study of Japanese composition proceedings.
83
In order to determine compliance with the best-interests test, the authors
compare the discounted payment in reorganization and liquidation, taking
into account the length of the plan, the grace period given to the debtor,
and the time period required for liquidating the assets. They conclude that
there is substantial compliance with the best-interests test for conrmed
compositions.
Although there are no U.S. data to compare with, we feel that there are
still lessons to be learned from examining the performance of the Canadian
system in this area. To evaluate the extent to which proposals led under the
Canadian BA comply with the best-interests test, we adopt a slightly dier-
ent approach than Eisenberg & Tagashira. First, the reorganization payo
is measured as the sum of the periodic payments specied in the proposal,
79
Eisenberg & Tagashira nd similar results for Japanese rms in composition. T.
Eisenberg & S. Tagashira, supra note 4.
80
J. Martel, supra note 49.
81
Bankruptcy Code x1129(a)(7).
82
BA. x59(2) [BIA x59(2)].
83
T. Eisenberg & S. Tagashira, supra note 4.
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discounted at a 10 percent annual rate.
84
Second, a logit model of the proba-
bility of success of a proposal is estimated and the estimated coecients are
used to calculate a predicted probability of success for each proposal in the
sample.
85
Third, an expected discounted payo in reorganization is calcu-
lated as the discounted payment times the predicted probability of success of
the proposal. Next, an expected discounted liquidation payo is calculated
from the book value of the rms' assets, the estimated administration costs
in liquidation and the mean time for repayment in liquidation.
86
Table 5 reports the estimated mean values for the reorganization payo,
the discounted reorganization payo, the probability of success of the pro-
posal, the expected payment in reorganization, the discounted liquidation
payo, the surplus in reorganization over liquidation and the percentage of
proposals which fail the best-interests test. These variables are rst calcu-
lated for the full sample of rms in the data set and then, for comparison,
separately for accepted and rejected proposals.
87
According to calculations
for the full sample, the proposed reorganization payo is equal to 37.97 cents
for every dollar of claims. Taking into account the time factor and the proba-
bility of success of the proposals, unsecured creditors expect to receive 24.32
cents in reorganization while they only anticipate 2.6 cents from liquidation.
This leaves creditors with a surplus of 21.70 cents in reorganization. Interest-
ingly, only four percent of the proposals in the sample fail the best-interests
test, a gure similar to the one reported by Eisenberg and Tagashira (1994).
In comparing the subsamples of accepted and rejected proposals, the data
show that the surplus to unsecured creditors in reorganization is larger for ac-
84
We use a higher discount rate that Eisenberg & Tagashira (1994) who use a 7 percent
rate. Given the high risks associated with these rms, a 10 percent rate is not unreasonable.
Monthly payments are discounted using a compounded monthly discount rate consistent
with a 10 percent annual rate.
85
J. Martel, supra note 49.
86
The gross liquidation value of assets is estimated using a ratio of market to book
value of 50 percent. Administration costs in liquidation are measured by category of book
value of assets and estimated in proportion of the value of liquidated assets. They are
equal to 62.9 percent for rms with assets lower than $100,000; 15.7 percent for rms with
assets between $100,000 and $500,000; 9.5 percent for rms with assets between $500,000
and $1,000,000; and 4.3 percent for rms with assets greater than $1,000,000. The net
liquidation value of assets is delayed by 2.24 years, which is the mean period of time in
liquidation and discounted at a 10 percent rate. See J. Martel supra note 12.
87
The full sample comprises 303 proposals for which all the relevant information is
available. There are 235 accepted and 68 rejected proposals.
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cepted than for rejected proposals. Also, compliance with the best-interests
test is higher for the subsample of accepted proposals. Overall, the data
show that there is substantial compliance with the best-interests for propos-
als under the Canadian BA and there are gains for unsecured creditors in
reorganization.
5.5 Administrative costs
An fundamental criticism of the formal bankruptcy mechanism is its high
cost.
88
There have been numerous studies in the U.S. that try to measure
the size of bankruptcy costs. Warner (1977) nds that, on average, admin-
istrative costs amount to 5.3 percent of market value debt and equity at the
time of bankruptcy for 11 railroad companies ling for bankruptcy during
1933{55.
89
Similarly, Altman (1984) nds the ratio of administrative costs to
asset market value of 6.0 percent in a sample of 18 manufacturers and retail-
ers.
90
White (1983) nds that administrative costs are 16 percent of the book
value of liabilities at the time of ling for 96 rms ling for reorganization
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act (prior to 1979).
91
Weiss (1990) estimates
that bankruptcy costs amount to 21 percent of the market value of equity
at the time of ling.
92
But Weiss also nds that bankruptcy costs amount
to only 3.1 percent of the sum of the book value of debt and market value
equity and to only 2.8 percent of the book value of assets. Similarly, Betker
(1995) nds a ratio of direct costs to assets of 3.9 percent for 75 Chapter 11
cases.
93
From a sample of 393 rms in Canada, Martel (1994a) estimates that,
at the time of ling, administrative costs amount to 4.3 percent of the book
value of debt, 23 percent of the book value of assets, and 13 percent of the to-
88
Bankruptcy costs can be divided into two components: direct and indirect costs. Given
the absence of Canadian evidence on indirect bankruptcy costs, this study concentrates
on direct costs.
89
J. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, Journal of Finance 32 (1977).
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E. Altman, A Further Empirical Examination of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39
Journal of Finance (1984).
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M. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, Journal of Finance 38
(1983).
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tal payment to creditors under the proposal.
94
Fisher & Martel (1994b) nd
a mean ratio of administrative costs to assets of 22 percent and to total pay-
ment to creditors of 12 percent, which are very close to Martel's numbers.
95
These values are higher than those reported by Ang, Chua & McConnell
(1982), White (1983), and White (1984) who report a mean ratio of admin-
istrative costs to total payment to creditors of 7.5 percent, 6.0 percent, and
3.0 percent respectively.
96
The dierence in the relative size of administrative costs between Canada
and the U.S. is somewhat paradoxical. As indicated above, reorganization in
Canada is accomplished much more quickly than in the U.S. Moreover, the
daily cost of reorganization is lower in Canada. Martel (1994a) estimates that
each extra day in reorganization raises total administrative costs by roughly
$24. Fisher & Martel (1994b) nd an even lower gure: each extra day adds
about $8 to the administrative cost of reorganization.
97
These variable cost
gure are signicantly lower than those reported by White (1981) for the U.S.,
who nds that an extra month in reorganization raises administrative costs
by $2,240, or roughly $75 a day. Thus, the variable costs of reorganization
in Canada, i.e., the number of days in reorganization times the daily cost,
are lower than the variable costs in the U.S., which, everything else equal,
would imply lower administrative costs in Canada. However, the ratio of
administrative costs to total payments to creditors is higher in Canada. We
propose some tentative explanations.
One explanation lies in the xed, as opposed to the variable, costs of re-
organization. Unlike most U.S. studies, which examine large rms, Canadian
studies are based on relatively small rms. When combined with the nd-
ing that there is a large xed cost component in administrative costs, it is
possible that the apparently high administration costs in Canada are simply
due to the relatively large number of small rms reorganizing in Canada.
In other words, if we could control for dierences in rm size between the
U.S. and Canadian data sets, the dierences in administrative costs might
be much smaller. Regressing administrative costs on assets, Martel (1994a)
94
The total payment to creditors is the sum of secured claims and preferred claims plus
the proposed return on the dollar to unsecured creditors times unsecured claims. J. Martel,
supra note 12.
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estimates that the xed costs component in reorganization is approximately
equal to $23,000 and is signicantly dierent from zero at the one percent
level.
98
This contrasts with Betker (1995) who estimates that the xed costs
component in Chapter 11 reorganization is not signicantly dierent than
zero.
99
The higher administrative costs in Canada can also be explained in part
by the presence of a trustee during proceedings. A necessary condition for the
commencement of reorganization proceedings in Canada is that the debtor
le a copy of the proposal with a trustee.
100
Therefore, a trustee is always
present the reorganization of a Canadian rm. According to Fisher & Martel
(1994b) and Martel (1994a), trustees' fees amount to 75-80 percent of the
administrative costs of reorganization.
101
In contrast, trustees are seldom
present in U.S. reorganization proceedings. LoPucki (1983) reports the nom-
ination of a trustee in only 5 of the 48 cases examined.
102
Jensen-Conklin
(1992) reports no cases in which a trustee was appointed.
103
It is clear from the data that the time spent in reorganization is a deter-
minant of direct bankruptcy costs. However, for the purpose of this study,
time in reorganization is considered separately below.
5.6 Time in Reorganization
Another important element measuring the performance of the reorganization
process is the amount of time spent by rms in reorganization. As pointed
out by LoPucki (1993), reorganization can only be eective when cases move
quickly.
104
In addition, Bermant, Lombard & Wiggins (1991) show that,
although Chapter 11 cases represented only 2.5 percent of all lings under
the Code in 1989, they required approximately 37 percent of all judicial
eort.
105
The length of the reorganization process has been examined by many
studies in the U.S. and the ndings vary signicantly. The time in reor-
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ganization is dened in these studies as the time between the ling of the
proposal and conrmation by the bankruptcy court. Based on a sample
of 26 conrmed plans under the Bankruptcy Code, White (1984) estimates
the average time period between ling and conrmation at 17 months.
106
From a sample of 30 rms which emerged from Chapter 11 during the period
1970{84, Franks & Torous (1989) estimate that the average time spent in
Chapter 11 is about 44 months.
107
Franks & Torous (1994) estimate a mean
time in reorganization of about 30 months from a sample of 37 rms which
led for Chapter 11 over the period 1983{88.
108
Flynn nds a mean time of
25 months and that 18 percent of conrmations happen less than one year
after ling, 43 percent between one and two years from ling, 22 percent be-
tween two and three years, and 17 percent after more than three years from
ling.
109
These results are similar to Altman (1993) who examines a sample
of 284 Chapter 11 cases for the period 1979{91.
110
According to Altman, the
mean time in reorganization is equal to 21 months, with 31 percent of the
plans being conrmed in less than a year from ling, 37 percent between one
and two years, 19 percent between two and three years, and 13 percent after
more than three years from ling. Gilson, John & Lang (1990), examine a
sample of 89 Chapter 11 cases and nd a mean time in reorganization of 20
months.
111
Lastly, Jensen-Conklin (1992) reports a mean time of 22 months,
Weiss (1992) nds a mean time of 30 months for 37 cases in the 1979{86
period, and Daigle & Maloney (1994) report a mean time of 21 months from
a sample of 56 rms.
112
Although Canadian studies do not measure the time between ling and
conrmation, they do measure the time period between ling and voting by
unsecured creditors. Everything else being equal, this period is shorter than
the ling-to-conrmation measure used in U.S. studies. However, as we will
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see, the dierence between the two systems is so large that it cannot be ex-
plained simply by the dierence in denitions. According to Fisher & Martel
(1994b), the average time between ling and voting on a reorganization plan
under the BA is 51 days. Voting occurs in less than 30 days in roughly 90
percent of the proposals. Martel (1994a) nds similar results: the average
time between ling and voting is 50 days, 60 percent of the proposals are
voted on within 30 days of ling, 84 percent within 60 days, and 90 percent
within 90 days. Typically, the time required for conrmation of a proposal
by the court is between three weeks and one month, so let us suppose it is 30
days.
113
This implies that the average time between ling and conrmation
is around 80 days (50 days plus 30 days). Thus, U.S. rms take at least
6.4 and at most 17 times longer in judicial proceedings compared with their
Canadian counterparts.
The two Canadian studies also report the total time spent by rms in
reorganization, which is measured by the number of days between the voting
date and the trustee's discharge date. Fisher & Martel (1994b) and Martel
(1994), respectively, nd that rms spend about 45 months and 38 months
in the reorganization process before being freed of all their obligations under
their proposals.
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5.7 Violation of Absolute Priority
Another criticism of court-supervised reorganization is that it gives rise to vi-
olations of the absolute priority rule (APR). Technically, absolute priority is
violated when lower-rank creditors receive payments while higher-rank cred-
itors receive less than full repayment of their claims. In the U.S., many em-
pirical studies conrm deviation from absolute priority. According to Franks
& Torous (1989), the fact that the debtor keeps control over the rm during
the reorganization period gives them additional bargaining power in their
negotiations with creditors.
115
For instance, the debtor can intentionally de-
lay the proceedings or invest in projects that could reduce the value of the
creditors' claims. To avoid such actions, creditors may be willing to accept
a reduction in their level of compensation to the benet of the rm's equity-
113
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holders. The authors nd that the APR is violated in 78 percent of the cases
(21/27). In a subsequent study, Franks & Torous (1994) nd 80 percent of
37 cases examined violate the APR.
116
The mean value of the deviation for
the benet of equity-holders is estimated at 2.3 percent of the total value of
the restructured rm's securities. Similarly, Eberhart, Moore & Roenfeldt
(1990) nd a deviation from the APR in 77 percent of the 30 cases examined
in their study and a mean equity deviation of 7.5 percent of the value of
restructured securities.
117
In addition, the authors suggest that these devia-
tions are anticipated by market participants and hence reected in the price
of equity.
Weiss (1990) nds that the APR is violated 78 percent of the time and
that strict priority of unsecured claims is violated in almost three-quarters of
the cases.
118
White (1992) estimates that although equity-holders typically
receive nothing when creditors receive less than 20 percent of the value of
their original claims, they capture 79 cents for every additional dollar paid by
the rm to creditors, the other 21 cents being captured by the creditors.
119
Finally, Daigle & Maloney (1994) nd that equity deviations occurred in 40
of 46 rms which reorganized as a going concern and the mean amount of
equity retained by the existing shareholders was 35 percent.
120
In Canada, the importance of deviations from APR in reorganization
is not well documented. However, Martel (1996b) argues that the APR
between classes of creditors is likely to be respected in most reorganization
cases under the BA.
121
A proposal typically provides for the repayment of
secured claims according to the existing contract or as renegotiated by the
parties, translating into the full repayment of the original secured claims.
Also, a proposal must explicitly provide for the full repayment of preferred
claims in the order specied in section 136(1) of the Act before ordinary
unsecured creditors can receive any payment. Therefore, Martel argues that
there is likely to be little violation of the APR between classes of creditors.
116
J. Franks & W. Torous, supra note 108.
117
A. Eberhart, W. Moore & R. Roenfeldt, supra note 9.
118
L. Weiss, supra note 8. Weiss argues that expected deviations from the APR also aect
the price of debt since creditors anticipate a wealth transfer to equity-holders. However,
Weiss provides no empirical evidence on the magnitude of the eect.
119
M. White, Measuring Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
Journal of Legal Economics (July 1992).
120
K. Daigle & M. Maloney, supra note 9.
121
J. Martel, Solutions au stress nanciers: Un survol de la litterature, 72 Actualte
Economique (1996).
26
However, a systematic violation of the APR does occur when considering
the treatment of equity-holders. Strictly speaking, equity-holders should lose
all their control rights on the rm's assets if a class of creditors receives less
than full payment of their claims, in which case equity and control of the
rm is given to existing creditors. This reallocation of the rm's assets is
natural in the case of rms with publicly traded shares, but it can represent
an important problem in the case of rms with no shares traded or in cases
of small businesses in which the managers are also the owners. For LoPucki
& Withford (1990), the APR is \virtually stood on its head" in such cases.
Since the rm's future is highly dependent on the owner-manager's expertise,
creditors are willing to waive part of the rights in the reorganized rms.
122
Given that 97 percent of the rms in reorganization under the Canadian BA
are rms with no publicly traded shares, the APR is likely to be violated in
almost every case.
123
6 Lessons for Chapter 11
The rst lesson we learn from Canadian experience is that, contrary to com-
mon belief in the U.S., reorganization is not simply a station to eventual
liquidation. Between 55 percent and 63 percent of Canadian rms reorganiz-
ing under the BA emerge as ongoing entities. It might be argued that this is
due to the screening role played by the bankruptcy court in Canada.
124
Sec-
tion 50.4(11) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (post November 1992)
allows the court to terminate a reorganization case early if it feels that the
debtor has not acted in good faith, is not in a position to make a viable
proposal that will be accepted by creditors, or if the creditors would be prej-
udiced by continuation of the case. But the BA (prior to November 1992)
did not have a similar provision: the court had no power to terminate a
reorganization case before the creditors' vote on the proposal. Thus, since
the cases used in this study are from before 1992, one cannot attribute high
survival rates to any screening role played by the bankruptcy court.
There is no support either for the claim that the problem with bankruptcy
law is that too many small rms try to reorganize when they should be liq-
uidated. Canadian data show no correlation between size and acceptance,
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conrmation, or consummation. Thus, the data provide little support for
a recent suggestion to have two distinct reorganization procedures, one for
small-to-medium size rms and one for large rms.
125
A single reorganiza-
tion procedure with enough exibility to accommodate all types of rms is
preferable to a dual system, which could give rise to strategic behavior.
126
Another lesson that Chapter 11 could take from the Canadian reorgani-
zation process is the speed at which nancial distress is resolved. In Canada,
creditors vote on proposals, on average, less than 50 days after ling. Also,
90 percent of proposals come to a vote within three months. Furthermore,
the average grace period is less than four months and creditors can expect
to recover almost 80 percent of the proposed payment in the plan within a
year of conrmation.
There are two potential explanations for the relatively quick resolution
of reorganization in Canada. First, there is no exclusivity period for debtors
and, more generally, there are greater incentives for parties to negotiate early
in the process. Second, every reorganization case under the BA is supervised
by a trustee. Although the pre-1992 BA did not specify explicit time limits
for debtors to le proposals, in practice the system seems to have resulted in
rapid votes on proposals. Fisher & Martel (1995) nd that the probability of
acceptance of a proposal decreases with the time between the ling and voting
on a proposal, suggesting implicit time constraints on reorganizing rms.
127
And Martel (1996a) nds that `holding' proposals have a 27 percent lower
probability of being accepted than non-holding proposals, again suggesting
implicit time limits in the system.
128
The trustee discloses information to
parties and oversees the process of reorganization. By disseminating infor-
mation, the trustee stimulates negotiation between debtors and creditors and
makes the process more transparent, thereby reducing the amount of time
necessary to reach a settlement.
129
The trustee can also bring experience
and knowledge of the process to rms and creditors that have not previously
125
L. LoPucki, supra note 4.
126
In the conclusion, we argue that the existing Canadian system with two reorganization
procedures should be reformed to allow only for one procedure.
127
T. Fisher & J. Martel, supra note 12.
128
J. Martel, supra note 49. A holding proposal is an interim document led by rms
requiring more time to prepare a nal proposal.
129
In discussing the success of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Triantis
(1996) makes the same argument: \the key to the success of this model in Canada is
the disclosure of information during the reorganization process : : :" G. Triantis, supra
note 11.
28
taken part in a nancial reorganization. Nonetheless, it must be noted that
trustees are costly. Arguably, a more rapid solution to nancial distress and
a better separation of rms before reorganization will compensate for the
increased bankruptcy costs associated with the presence of a trustee.
An obvious way to speed up Chapter 11 is to reduce the length of the
exclusivity period. However, while feasible, this is unlikely to work very well
in practice. LoPucki (1993) nds that the introduction of a pre-determined
exclusivity period with the Bankruptcy Code resulted in rms exploiting the
maximum time period to le proposals.
130
Thus, whatever the length of
the exclusivity period, it is likely that rms will make full use of the time.
Moreover, rms can extend the exclusivity period by making an application
to the court, which almost always approves extensions. Thus, in practice,
management can take as long as they want before ling proposals. Another
way to speed up the process would be to repeal the exclusivity period given
to debtors, grant creditors permission to propose amendments to the origi-
nal proposal led by the debtor, and require the presence of trustee in every
reorganization case. According to Canadian experience, we expect this sys-
tem will converge to an equilibrium state in which the time rms take to le
proposals will be determined by the behavior of all parties involved in the
process, rather than just the rms alone. In addition, this system should
minimize bankruptcy court intervention which would unduly delay the re-
organization process. On the other hand, the court should have enough
exibility to dismiss cases where the debtor is not acting in good faith.
131
As with the Canadian system, the nomination of a trustee and the possibil-
ity for creditors to propose amendments early in the reorganization process
should accelerate the process and ensure a more ecient solution to nancial
distress.
In addition to these possible changes, we recommend that the `cram down'
provision be abolished from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
132
Cram down allows
the court to impose a plan on dissenting creditors after a process involving a
lengthy and costly evaluation of the rm. From an eciency point of view,
cram down is dicult to justify. As pointed out by Aghion, Hart and Moore
(1992), Chapter 11 gives considerable discretion to the bankruptcy court
whereas eciency requires leaving the rm's future in the hands of those
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directly aected by the nancial distress, namely the creditors.
133
Thus,
cram down essentially implies the court: (i) has better information than
creditors on the future viability of the rm, or (ii) has the same information
as creditors and estimates that the rm has a higher probability of success
than dissenting creditors, or (iii) takes into account other considerations such
as job losses, environmental damage, the rights of retirees to their pensions,
and so on.
134
The rst possibility is dicult to believe given creditors have access to
basically the same information as the court. The second possibility is more
believable but is not desirable. As pointed out by Bebchuk (1988), reorga-
nization represents, in essence, the sale of the rm to existing creditors who
pay the rm with their existing claims and receive new interests in the reor-
ganized rm. Since a rm's future should be decided by its owners, existing
creditors at the time of reorganization should have the exclusive right to de-
cide upon the rm's future. Extending this right to the court implies that
there may be other considerations to the rm's reorganization. This is the
third possibility raised above.
Broude (1994) argues that there may be good reasons to look at other
considerations in reorganization.
135
According to Broude, bankruptcy sys-
tems cannot be considered in isolation but must be addressed in a wider
context, taking into account, for instance, social and environmental concerns
as well as economic considerations. Thus, Broude argues that Chapter 11
could be used to deal with a range of consequences of nancial failure like
unemployment, loss of pension rights, environmental clean-up and so on. We
totally disagree with this approach to bankruptcy law. It is our view that
bankruptcy law should be aimed at nding an ecient solution to nancial
distress, either through the liquidation or the reorganization of a debtor's ac-
tivities. It should not be used to solve problems that can be dealt with more
eectively by other legislation. In addition, Broude overlooks an important
problem created with his approach, namely that of moral hazard. Moral haz-
ard arises when unobservable or hidden actions by agents acting in their own
interest impose costs on others.
136
In the present context, using bankruptcy
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law to serve environmental goals may reduce incentives to rms to minimize
the possibility of environmental damage and, hence, increase the likelihood of
an accident. A similar argument could be made for unpaid wages. This is not
to say that wage earners should not be insured, but rather that bankruptcy
law is not the right tool to insure wage earners against nancial distress. In
general, using bankruptcy law to deal with problems that are not directly
related to nancial distress simply gives parties incentives to use the law for
their own interests rather than for the interests of all creditors. Moreover,
we agree with Aghion, Hart & Moore (1992) who suggest that bankruptcy
law should penalize managers adequately following nancial distress. This is
true for managers activities associated directly with bankruptcy as well as
for indirect eects such as environmental damages, in which case managers
could be held personally responsible for their actions.
137
7 Conclusion
We have presented ample evidence of the relative eciency of the Canadian
reorganization procedure under the BA relative. The system promotes bar-
gaining between debtors and creditors, puts the rm's future in the hands of
creditors, oers a rapid resolution of nancial problems, and a rapid repay-
ment of creditors' claims. In addition, relative to liquidation, reorganization
oers a net expected gain to creditors in over 95 percent of cases. Since the
Canadian system shares many key aspects of the U.S. reorganization proce-
dure, the evidence presented here suggests that there exist viable avenues to
explore for reforming Chapter 11.
Canadian conrmation and consummation rates are signicantly higher
than those in the U.S., and there is no correlation between these rates and
rm size. This oers no support for the view that \we need to be choosier
about rms admitted to Chapter 11."
138
We believe that ineciency in the
U.S. reorganization process is due to the fact that the system gives the wrong
incentives to participants and that the rm's future is not left exclusively to
the creditors. Granting the bankruptcy court more discretion about who
should and should not be admitted to Chapter 11 would simply reduce the
eciency of the system further. Thus, while we favor court intervention to
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dismiss inadmissible cases, we believe that, in most reorganizations, the nal
decision should be in the hands of creditors. Moreover, creditors should be
allowed to express their decision soon after the ling of a plan.
We claim that the Canadian reorganization procedure in the BA prior to
the 1992 reform is a viable model for reforming Chapter 11. But the 1992
reform of the BA made it more similar to Chapter 11.
139
From the standpoint
of economic eciency, therefore, we believe that the amendments to the
Canadian BA represent a step backward. Analyzing the possible impact of
the 1992 reform, Fisher & Martel (1995) and Martel (1995) conclude that the
reform should have only a slight impact on the acceptance rate of proposals.
However, the new regime is expected to attract even more rms in the lower
tail of the distribution of nancially distressed rms. This will worsen the
screening properties of the bankruptcy system and make the system more
costly to the Canadian economy. Thus, to the extent that there are lessons
to be learned from the Canadian experience, we suggest that the lessons
should be learned from the pre-1992 Act and not the reformed Act.
139
The main objective of the reform is to promote the use of nancial reorganization in
order to increase the chances of survival of rms in nancial distress and to save jobs.
The new Act also oers increased protection to wage earners in bankrupt rms. Fisher &
Martel and Martel, supra note 1.
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TABLE 1
Characteristics of Reorganizing Firms
1
Variable Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Financial variables
2
Total assets 2,453.3 350.9 19,674.4 0.0 385,770.7
Total debts 2,981.5 783.9 15,876.0 22.0 301,745.9
Secured debts 1,610.4 201.3 12,248.1 0.0 237,443.4
Ordinary debts 1,008.8 438.8 2,025.6 11.7 25,659.6
Preferred debts 111.5 23.7 322.0 0.0 4,318.7
Crown debts 76.1 15.1 204.7 0.0 2,424.7
Contingent debts 250.8 0.0 2,992.2 0.0 56,880.0
Financial ratios
3
Asset / debt 58.3 55.3 37.2 0.0 229.0
Secured debt / asset
4
54.9 56.4 35.7 0.0 100.0
Secured debt / debt 32.0 30.8 25.1 0.0 96.3
Largest secured claim / debt 23.7 21.5 19.9 0.0 91.5
Ordinary debt / debt 59.5 58.2 26.4 1.0 100.0
Preferred debt / debt 6.1 3.5 7.7 0.0 51.6
Crown debt / debt 4.5 2.1 6.7 0.0 49.8
Creditor variables
Total number of creditors 110.3 68.0 142.0 4.0 1,257.0
Number of secured creditors 3.4 2.0 17.1 0.0 331.0
Number of ordinary creditors 86.5 59.0 98.2 2.0 834.0
Number of preferred creditors 20.1 3.0 65.7 0.0 826.0
Creditor ratios
3
Secured creditors / total creditors 4.4 2.3 7.4 0.0 69.2
Ordinary creditors / total creditors 84.4 89.0 14.6 15.3 100.0
Preferred creditors / total creditors 10.8 5.4 13.5 0.0 75.3
Notes:
1. The information contained in the table is based on 393 plans.
2. Measured in thousands of fourth quarter 1993 Canadian dollars normalized
by the gdp deator (Cansim Series number D20556).
3. Measured in percent.
4. In cases where the ratio exceeds 100% (including 14 rms with zero assets),
it is set to 100%.
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TABLE 2
Characteristics of the Reorganization Process
Variables N Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Time variables
1
Time between ling and voting 388 50.0 25.0 105.5 0.0 1,681.0
Time in reorganization 354 1,136.4 965.0 756.6 70.0 5,057.0
Unsecured creditors meeting variables
Number of amendments to the plan 390 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.0
Number of creditors at the meeting 330 30.9 19.0 36.8 1.0 269.0
% creditors at the meeting 330 34.5 32.7 17.0 4.1 100.0
% creditors approving the plan 330 84.4 90.9 20.2 0.0 100.0
% claims approving the plan 330 80.6 29.8 29.8 0.0 100.0
Direct cost variables
2
Administration costs 344 46.3 20.0 92.2 1.7 897.0
Trustees fees 340 27.8 13.6 46.3 0.6 399.4
Direct cost ratios
3
Trustees fees / administration costs 340 69.4 72.9 17.1 4.1 97.8
Administration costs / payments
4
314 13.1 5.5 24.9 0.0 328.0
Administration costs / total assets 344 4.8 2.9 5.3 0.0 34.3
Administration costs / total debts 344 22.5 5.7 81.1 0.0 1,019.3
Notes:
1. Measured in days.
2. Measured in thousands of fourth quarter 1993 Canadian dollars normalized
by the gdp deator (Cansim Series number D20556).
3. Measured in percent. While all none of the minimum values are equal to
zero, some are reported as zeros due to rounding.
4. Payments = secured debts + preferred debts + (ordinary debts  payo on
ordinary claims).
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TABLE 3
Acceptance, Confirmation, and Consummation Rates by
Assets
1
Assets Acceptance Conrmation Consummation
rate rate rate
1
(percent) (percent) (percent)
less than $100,000 86.3 83.2 77.5
$100,000 to $500,000 69.8 65.1 68.2
$500,000 to $1 million 68.9 67.2 71.4
$1 million to $5 million 72.6 63.1 70.7
$5 million to $10 million 86.7 80.0 76.9
more than $10 million 66.7 58.3 71.4
less than $1 million 75.2 71.6 72.5
more than $1 million 73.9 64.9 71.8
All rms 74.8 69.7 72.3
TABLE 4
Possible Incidence of Type I and Type II Errors
in the Creditors' Decision
Number of rejected plans Incidence of Incidence of
Type I errors Type II errors
from viable rms from nonviable rms (percent) (percent)
0 84 44.0 0.0
6 78 45.8 2.9
30 54 55.0 13.3
54 30 68.8 21.4
72 12 84.6 26.7
84 0 100.0 29.8
Notes:
1. The consummation rate measures the proportion of proposals accepted by
creditors, conrmed by the bankruptcy court and for which all payments to
creditors were made under the plan before the trustee is discharged.
39
TABLE 5
Estimated Surplus
1
and Best-Interests Test
Full Accepted Rejected
sample plans plans
Payment .3797 .3822 .3711
Discounted payment .3385 .3393 .3357
Probability of success .7509 .7660 .6987
Expected discounted payment .2432 .2481 .2265
Discounted liquidation payment .0260 .0246 .0316
Reorganization surplus .2170 .2235 .1949
Plans failing best-interests test
2
4.0 3.8 4.4
Notes:
1. Measured per dollar of claims.
2. Measured in percent.
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